Puzzle-solving in Psychology: the Neo-Galtonian vs

Abstract

We compare the neo-Galtonian and nomothetic approaches of psychological research. While the former focuses on summarized statistics that depict average subjects, the latter focuses on general facts of form 'if conditions then restricted outcomes'. The nomothetic approach does not require quantification as a convenient way of statistical modeling. The nice feature of a general fact is its falsifiability by the observation of a single case. Hence, as a clear sense of scientific error is re-introduced in the research paradigm, we detail two kinds of puzzle-solving: repairing general facts by contraction or by expansion of the initial conditions. This style of research does not require that researchers depend on highly skilled engineers in data analysis, as the very structure of a general fact can be established by scrutinizing a contingency table

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
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The aim and structure of physical theory.Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - 1954 - Princeton,: Princeton University Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.

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