Abstract

This thesis attempts to provide an overview of Kant's science of metaphysics as presented in the Transcendental Logic portion of the Critique of Pure Reason through the System of Principles. I propose that Kant's arguments can best be understood as a construction of formal time. Formal time is an abstract notion combining pure intuitions and pure concepts. The construction provides the framework or structure in which we can comprehend Kant's theory of possible experience. ;Since the construction of formal time is a synthetic procedure, I suggest in Part I of this thesis a broader interpretation of 'analytic' and 'synthetic,' one that is based upon seeing these as methods of reasoning. For Kant, the analytic is the rational examination of something previously given. The synthetic is a procedure of rational fabrication. My view of the analytic/synthetic is thus broader than the more common view . My discussion of analysis and synthesis in Part I rests not only on the first Critique but also on the "Inquiry" of 1763 and Jasche's edition of the Logic. ;In the course of the discussion in Part II, I deal at some length with the texts of Kant's Introduction to Transcendental Logic, the Analytic of Concepts and the Analytic of Principles . In my discussion of these texts, I explain the construction of formal time. For example, I show that a key issue in the Second Analogy is the differentiation of merely subjective temporal succession from objective temporal succession which allows for the establishment of the seriality of formal time. The Third Analogy, by contrast, is argued to deal with the construction of formal space, given objective temporal succession. The Axioms of Intuition and the Anticipations of Perception, on the other hand, are discussed with regard to their role for providing units of formal time which the relational categories then act upon to generate the order of formal time