Abstract

Hegel's youthful thinking may be seen as a long struggle with three interlacing problems : 1. The problem of the objectivity particular to the subject, 2. The problem of the universal validity of the individual, 3. The problem of the highest unity of the spiritual and in the spiritual. Looking on it from the point of view of this last problem, the evolution of Hegel's thinking during the protracted hidden period that precedes the publication of the Phenomenology of the Spirit, can be summarized as follows : In Bern the Absolute presents itself to him as the highest point ; as an abstract unity, obtained by sacriAcing the concrete ; as Kant's „Vernunft”. In Frankfurt however the rich totality takes the upper hand : the „Hen kai Pan”, „Das Leben” of the early German Romantici. In Jena Hegel strives to find a concept that would have the power to reconcile both his previous standpoints. Now the Absolute becomes the totality, as a unity that comprehends itself in its indivisibility as a subject, and that hereby contracts itself to the highest point. In the above article we try to compare the passage of Phenomenology on the life and death struggle with the treatments of this same theme in the earlier writings of the Jena period. This might be a modest contribution to a better understanding of the very concise text of Phenomenology. But there is more. In the said passage of Phenomenology Hegel's comparatively ripened conception concerning the three problems mentioned above, can be found at its maximum point. That's why a comparison with the earlier treatments enables us to follow the evolution of Hegel's fundamental ideas during the Jena period . In its general outline this evolution may be presented as follows : 1. The characteristic „Selfconsciousness” of the subject becomes more prominent. Herewith the problem of the objectivity particular to the subject is put much more neatly and sharply, and at the same time the objectivity enters much more profoundly into the subject itself. From now on the fundamental evolution of the subject can be considered as a dialectic process of the subject with its own objectivity. 2. The individual is absorbed by the universal less immediately and the point of individuality is now required even within the universal. 3. In our texts we can watch Hegel's conviction grow : that the highest unity requires a point that contracts the totality in itself and transcends the multiplicity. More and more clearly „Spirit” transcends „life”. The negativity towards the multiplicity of life is therefore becoming stronger but at the same time more nuanced : the real efficient negativity should be „aufbewahrend” . It is only now and as a consequence of all this that the life and death struggle becomes possible ; one can only offer one's life on behalf of something that is higher than life. And likewise : only this renders the struggle of the subjects necessary from within, in as much as the struggle represents a radical negativity. Where the foundations of social life are concerned, the „love” of the Frankfurt period, which united all the dispersed element in its ample robe, is not adequate any more. Love lacks the necessary negativity as well as it does not really assume the objects into the subjectivity. Love unites the subjects immediately. Through the willing spirit of sacrifice of the subjects the struggle for the objects is avoided. But in fact the objects stay out of the union. In Phenomenology objectivity is introduced into the subjects themselves through self consciousness. It is this objectivity that throws the subjects into the struggle. That's how the necessary sacrifice of life in and through the battle originates. Moreover, in Phenomenology the death of the individual, which in Realphilosophie immediately gave rise to the universal „Volk”, is no longer adequate. Now Hegel sees through his idea in all its consequences : „Das Volk” is no longer the highest reality, for it is not the highest self conscious point. In this article we try to make all this clear in a survey of Hegel's texts, keeping in mind the two following questions : 1. What is it that renders the struggle necessary, irrevocable ? And at the same time : What is at stake in this battle ? What is the intention of the participants ? 2. What is the outcome of the battle ? And what is it that determines that outcome ? In the first, introductory, chapter it is briefly stated what part the „Herr und Knecht” and „Kampf” themes played in Hegel's manuscripts before 1803. At that time Hegel had not yet discovered their positive significance. In the second chapter we examine these themes as they appear in System der Sittlichkeit. Here they take already a definite position in a continuous dialectic process of human relationships. But they have as yet no basic part in the development of the Spirit, show no real necessity and are still dependent on a more or less external objectivity. In Realphilosophie I an important step is taken : the life and death struggle is assigned an important part in the development of conscience ; it is drawn into the central theme : „die Anerkennung” and herewith acquires necessity. Nevertheless the reason for the battle remains utterly ambiguous. Now Hegel proclaims that the only sensible outcome of the battle is death, which immediately brings „ das Volk" into existence. The „Herr-Knecht”-relation is now looked upon as a mere impasse. The brief treatment of our themes in Realphilosophie II does not yield many new elements. However „selfconsciousness' is now coming to the fore. And „die Anerkennung” is now really fundamental and „the first thing that has to be achieved”. In a fifth and last chapter we present a brief analysis of our passage of Phenomenology itself, in the light of the preceding. It is only in Phenomenology that the reason of the battle loses all ambiguity. No accidental provocation is involved any more. Hegel realizes now that death does not permit any further dialectics and that on the other hand the „Herr-Knecht”-relation has positive significance for the development of Self consciousness. But the question may be asked : to what degree Hegel succeeds in making this outcome of the battle sound credible within the framework of his dialectics ?