A Genealogy of Common Sense: Judgment in Eighteenth-Century Literature and Philosophy

Dissertation, Yale University (2000)
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Abstract

In every chapter of this dissertation---chapters which consider work by John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, David Hume, Adam Smith, Samuel Richardson, Jane Austen and Sir Joshua Reynolds---I show that the appeal each of these authors makes to the "common sense" of the reader mounts a deeply persuasive appeal to a collective vision of how things ought to be. Within empiricist epistemology, moral philosophy, fiction, and the discourse of art and aesthetics, I find that by assuming a moral consensus that unites that community of readers he or she addresses, each of these writers initiates the reader into such a consensus. A double moment underlies the ideal and description of a common sense: what enables the claim that one's judgment is commonsensical is the assumption that such a judgment would find general assent, general agreement. At the same time, judgments that make these claims model for the community the kind of judgments that ought to find agreement. The idea of community rests on the possibility that each and every agent is capable of an objective assent to its terms and conditions, and that, given this ability, each would arrive at the consensus which supports the community. ;One of the paradoxes of eighteenth-century British empiricist epistemology is that it suggests the clearest views are those offered through the arts. That is, the frame provided by the arts creates a space which abstracts from a common-sense view of things to things "as they really are"---which is, really, as they ought to be. I explain the much noted intensity of the interest in developing a discourse of the aesthetic in the eighteenth century, or the emphasis placed on the idea of a single "standard of taste," as a consequence of the impasse in Locke's empiricist epistemology on the matter of objective judgments. The ability of perceivers to share a clear view of facts and objects, the view of reason and common sense, predicates Locke's project, yet the very possibility of such a view becomes more and more remote as his Essay proceeds. The model of aesthetic judgment which developed in the wake of Locke's Essay prioritized detachment and disinterest, and therefore offered the possibility of a distanced, and therefore objective, point of view, the point of view invoked in the appeal to common sense

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