A dilemma for permissibility-based solutions to the paradox of supererogation

Analysis 80 (4):723-731 (2020)
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Abstract

We argue that permissibility-based solutions to the paradox of supererogation encounter a nested dilemma. Such approaches solve the paradox by distinguishing moral and rational permissions. If they do not also include a bridge condition that relates these two permissions, then they violate a very plausible monotonicity condition. If they do include a bridge condition, then permissibility-based solutions either amount to rational satisficing or they collapse back into the classical account of supererogation and fail to resolve the paradox.

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Author Profiles

Marina Uzunova
VU University Amsterdam
Benjamin Ferguson
University of Warwick

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Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?Donald Davidson - 1969 - In Joel Feinberg (ed.), Moral concepts. London,: Oxford University Press.
The Limits of Moral Authority.Dale Dorsey - 2016 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.

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