Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86 (2014)

Michael Tye
University of Texas at Austin
Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or ‘sensible profile’ represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:Let ‘RED’ stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.Hence,(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.Since (3) is false, (1) is false too.(3) Follows from (1) and (2) only on the assumption that what it is for something to have a phenomenal character is for it to instantiate a certain property just as what it is for my pen to have the color red is for it to instantiate the property of being red. The property instantiation model of having a phenomenal character is not the only possible model, however, and I reject it.An alternative model is t
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0168-9
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References found in this work BETA

What Are Debates About Qualia Really About?Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):59-84.

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Citations of this work BETA

Yes, Phenomenal Character Really Is Out There In The World.Michael Tye - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):483-488.
Is Phenomenal Character Out There in the World?Jeff Speaks - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):465-482.
When Nothing Looks Blue.Joseph Gottlieb & Ali Rezaei - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2553-2561.

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