Abstract

The two grand theories of judging – legal realism and legal formalism - have their differences set around the importance of legal rules. For formalists, judging is a rule-bound activity. In its more extreme versions, a judge is seen as an operator of a giant syllogism machine. Legal realists, in contrast, argue that legal rules, at least formal legal rules, do not determine outcomes of cases. Legal realism has been misunderstood almost everywhere outside its birthplace – the United States. Continental legal theory, for one, views legal realism as practical, down-to-earth, hard-nosed school of thought which is opposed to the more “scientific” theories. The purpose of this article is two-fold. First, to show what legal realists really stood for - that contrary to the popular myth, they did not maintain that formal legal rules do not matter at all; that most of them considered legal rules to be important, only many of those rules are informal rules. Second, contrary to the popular understanding in Continental legal theory, legal realism by its nature was not an antiscientific theory of judging - in fact, it was either a first scientific theory of judging or at least its prototype.