Abstract

Emmanuel Levinas is often thought of as a philosopher of ethics, above all else. Indeed, his notions of the face, the Other, and alterity have all earned him a distinguished place in the history of phenomenology as a fundamental thinker of ethics as a first philosophy. But what has been overlooked in this attention on ethics is the early work of Levinas, which reveals him less a philosopher of the Other and more as a philosopher of elemental and anonymous being, a speculative metaphysician whose ethical voice was still in the process of forming. In this paper, I explore the early Levinas, specifically with an aim of assessing what he can tell us about phenomenology in its relation to the non-human world. I make two claims. One, Levinas’s idea of the “il y a” (the there is) offers us a novel way of rethinking the relation between the body and the world. This idea can be approached by phrasing Levinas as a materialist. Two, the experience of horror, which Levinas will place great onus on, provides us with a phenomenology at the threshold of experience. As I argue, it is precisely through what Levinas terms “the horror of the night,” that phenomenology begins to exceed its methodological constraints in accounting for a plane of elemental existence beyond experience.