The development of possible worlds semantics for modal claims has led to a more general application of that theory as a complete semantics for various formal and natural languages, and this view is widely held to be an adequate (philosophical) interpretation of the model theory for such languages. We argue here that this view generates a self-referential inconsistency that indicates either the falsity or the incompleteness of PWS.

Self-defeating and self-justifying expressions are reflexive insofar as they pertain to themselves. However, the reflexivity involved is often pragmatic, i.e., does not entirely depend upon the logical properties of what is expressed but also upon the expressive act. In this paper I present a general account of pragmatic reflexivity and apply it to some familiar self-defeating and self-justifying expressions in epistemology. This application indicates some important, if often neglected features of the epistemological issues involved. The account I defend suggests that (...) epistemology is particularly sensitive to pragmatic reflexivity since what epistemologists do, i.e., inquire, theorize, and defend theories, is also the subject of the inquiry and resultant theories. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that the conjunction of linguistic ersatzism, the ontologically deflationary view that possible worlds are maximal and consistent sets of sentences, and possible world semantics, the view that the meaning of a sentence is the set of possible worlds at which it is true, implies that no actual speaker can effectively use virtually any language to successfully communicate information. This result is based on complexity issues that relate to our finite computational ability to deal with (...) large bodies of information and a strong, but well motivated, assumption about the cognitive accessibility of meanings of sentences ersatzers seem to be implicitly committed to. It follows that linguistic ersatzism, possible world semantics, or both must be rejected. (shrink)

The prevailing notion that the problem of essential indexicals must be solved through the theory of meaning of attitude ascriptions is incorrect. Well-known attempts to solve the problem along those lines, e.g., the proposals of Lewis and Perry , have rested on the overly optimistic assumption that there is no limit in principle to the access one may have to the contents of someone else’s thoughts, including their knowledge. That assumption is challenged in this essay. The hazards associated with limited (...) accessibility can be and indeed must be alleviated by an epistemological theory in such a way that allows for a new nonsemantic approach to the problem. The following is an outline of the arguments in favor of this approach. In the first part, the problem of essential indexicals and the familiar corollary thesis that such indexicals are not reducible to nonindexicals is briefly reviewed. In the second part, indexical irreducibility is shown to hold for a range of explanations of theoretical rationality in addition to the basic explanations of action in which the irreducibility is typically illustrated. (shrink)