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Why the empirical literature fails to support or disconfirm modular or dual-process models
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):283-284 (2007)
Abstract
Barbey & Sloman (B&S) present five models that account for performance in Bayesian inference tasks, and argue that the data disconfirm four of them but support one model. Contrary to B&S, I argue that the cited data fail to provide strong confirmation or disconfirmation for any of the modelsMy notes
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References found in this work
Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate.H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):628-647.
Hypothesis testing and theory evaluation at the boundaries: Surprising insights from Bayes's theorem.David Trafimow - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (3):526-535.
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