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One wrong does not justify another: Accepting dual processes by fallacy of false alternatives
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (3):269-270 (2007)
Abstract
Barbey & Sloman (B&S) advocate a dual-process (two-system) approach by comparing it with an alternative perspective (ecological rationality), claiming that the latter is unwarranted. Rejecting this alternative approach cannot serve as sufficient evidence for the viability of the formerAuthor's Profile
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References found in this work
Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):645-665.
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.Steven A. Sloman - 1996 - Psychological Bulletin 119 (1):3-22.
The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges.Jonathan J. Koehler - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):1-17.
Trading spaces: Computation, representation, and the limits of uninformed learning.Andy Clark & Chris Thornton - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):57-66.
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