Synthese 199 (1-2):3023-3043 (2020)
AbstractImaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts that treat vividness as an explanatory primitive and with those that attempt to provide a definition. We apply the natural kind methodology to make several substantive claims about the vividness of mental imagery. First, we will argue that it forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity. In arguing for this claim, we also show how the cluster can be modified in the light of empirical research by complementing it with a correlation between vividness and familiarity. Second, we will argue that these correlations can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image.
Similar books and articles
Imaginative Vividness.Kind Amy - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):32-50.
Emotion, Perception, and Natural Kinds.Juan José Acero Fernández & José Manuel Palma Muñoz - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (2):153-161.
Are Psychiatric Kinds Real?Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary - 2010 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1):11-27.
Natural Diversity: A Neo-Essentialist Misconstrual of Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory in Natural Kind Debates.Joachim Lipski - 2020 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 82:94-103.
Can the Epistemic Value of Natural Kinds Be Explained Independently of Their Metaphysics?Catherine Kendig & John Grey - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):359-376.
Dealing with the Changeable and Blurry Edges of Living Things: A Modified Version of Property-Cluster Kinds.Jon Umerez & María Ferreira Ruiz - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):493-518.
Dealing with the Changeable and Blurry Edges of Living Things: A Modified Version of Property-Cluster Kinds.María J. Ferreira Ruiz & Jon Umerez - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):493-518.
Primacy, Recency, Frequency, and Vividness.A. Jersild - 1929 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 12 (1):58.
Limitations of Natural Kind Talk in the Life Sciences: Homology and Other Cases. [REVIEW]Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Biological Theory 7 (2):109-120.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
How to Keep Up Good Appearances: Desire, Imagination, and the Good.Uku Tooming - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1147-1160.
Situated self-awareness in expert performance: a situated normativity account of riken no ken.Katsunori Miyahara & Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-25.
Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
References found in this work
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds.Richard Boyd - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (1):127-148.