Utilitas 22 (3):331-350 (2010)

Abstract
According to a widely held view, people's commitments to laws are dependent on the existence in their community of a conventional practice of complying with certain fundamental laws. This conventionalism has significantly hampered our attempts to explain the normative practice of law. Ronald Dworkin has argued against conventionalism by bringing up the phenomenon of persistent fundamental legal controversies, but neither Dworkin nor his legal positivist respondents have correctly understood the real significance of such controversies. This article argues that such controversies pose a deep challenge to any conception of our legal practice as a genuinely normative, rule-mediated, practice. The article also argues that what is needed to deflect this challenge is a new understanding – different from the widely held conventionalist understanding – of how people's commitments to laws are predicated on their fellows’ like commitments
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DOI 10.1017/s0953820810000233
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References found in this work BETA

Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - Duckworth.
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.Peter Railton - 1984 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (2):134-171.
Taking Rights Seriously.Ronald Dworkin - 1979 - Mind 88 (350):305-309.
The Guise of the Good.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Noûs 26 (1):3 - 26.

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Four Neglected Prescriptions of Hartian Legal Philosophy.Kevin Toh - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (6):689-724.

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