Abstract

Philosophical sex-talk, i.e., discourse generated primarily by analytic philosophers to explicate the nature and intent of human sexuality, has presumed its discussion limited to a focus on sex as a relation with an Other. Contained in this view is a conception of masturbation as nonsexual and of 'perverted' sexual practices as those that either fail at incorporating an actual Other, or whose incorporation of a specific Other is in some way deemed inappropriate. This dissertation proposes to broaden the parameters of this discussion by exploring the virtues of a unitary model of sex--by which acts assessed as sexual may be carried out by one person alone and whose paradigm case is masturbation--as opposed to the more standard binary model--by which sex is an activity necessitating an Other, and whose paradigm case is intercourse. It proposes moreover, that such discussions begin by acknowledging a participating agent's desire to promote, either for him/herself and/or some Other, those sensations agent-identified as "sexually pleasurable sensations," yet leaves open what sorts of sensations might actually be taken to fulfill the stipulated criteria. What emerges from this analysis is that a philosophical defense of masturbation is possible if these discussions begin, not with the presumption that we need exclude from the vita sexualis that which fails at fulfilling an arbitrary criterion , but rather with allowing as sexual those acts that succeed in promoting the cited sensations. This dissertation outlines the framework for a more inclusive sexual philosophy which acknowledges the parsimonic primacy of the unitary model, yet which manages to preserve the integrity of the binary. It provides a theoretical basis for altering both the mainstream philosophical attitude toward the assessment of persons with "unusual" sexual preferences, and our social and political attitudes toward them as well