Epistemic risk in methodological triangulation: the case of implicit attitudes

Synthese 201 (1):1-22 (2022)
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Abstract

One important strategy for dealing with error in our methods is triangulation, or the use multiple methods to investigate the same object. Current accounts of triangulation assume that its primary function is to provide a confirmatory boost to hypotheses beyond what confirmation of each method alone could produce. Yet, researchers often use multiple methods to examine new constructs about which they are uncertain. For example, social psychologists use multiple indirect measures to provide convergent evidence about implicit attitudes, but how to characterize implicit attitudes is an open question. To make sense of triangulation under uncertainty about constructs, I suggest two changes: first, triangulation can serve multiple epistemic functions, including some that are non-confirmatory, and second, researchers should assess the epistemic risk in claims about evidence and the acceptance/rejection of hypotheses.

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Morgan Thompson
Cornell University

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Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.
Bias and values in scientific research.Torsten Wilholt - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):92-101.

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