On Planning: Toward a Natural History of Goal Attainment

Philosophical Papers 37 (2):289-317 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The goal of the essay is to articulate some beginnings for an empirical approach to the study of agency, in the firm conviction that agency is subject to scientific scrutiny, and is not to be abandoned to high-brow aprioristic philosophy. Drawing on insights from decision analysis, game theory, general dynamics, physics and engineering, this essay will examine the diversity of planning phenomena, and in that way take some steps towards assembling rudiments for the budding science, in the process innovating (parts of) a technical vocabulary. The key is focus upon the organization of effort in time. This paper categorizes forms of organization of effort in time, and yields an analysis of both individual agency and coalitions of agents as forms of effort organized in time. Finally, it articulates precise questions pertaining to the natural (evolutionary) history of forms of agency (once upon a time referred to as ‘Will’) that we now find on the ground.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,296

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Planning and Its Function in Our Lives.Michael E. Bratman - 2024 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 41 (1):1-15.
Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization.Michael Bratman - 2022 - New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
Shared agency.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Philosophy of the social sciences: philosophical theory and scientific practice. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41--59.
Mental Timetravel, Agency and Responsibility.Kennett Jeanette & Matthews Steve - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.
The Representation of Time in Agency.Holly Andersen - 2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Indeterminism and Agency.John F. Horty - 2001 - In John Horty (ed.), Agency and deontic logic. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-19

Downloads
8 (#1,345,183)

6 months
30 (#108,935)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mariam Thalos
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Citations of this work

Two Conceptions of Fundamentality.Mariam Thalos - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2):151-177.
Solidarity: A Motivational Conception.Mariam Thalos - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):57-95.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.R. Holton - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):218-221.

View all 17 references / Add more references