The Monist 100 (1):133-154 (2017)

Authors
Mark Textor
King's College London
Abstract
In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano’s change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano’s argument and it is superior to its predecessor.
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DOI 10.1093/monist/onw023
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References found in this work BETA

Monism: The Priority of the Whole.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):31-76.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Phenomenal Consciousness with Infallible Self-Representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.
Objective Mind and the Objectivity of Our Minds.Mark Johnston - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):233-268.

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Citations of this work BETA

Brentano on the Individuation of Mental Acts.Hamid Taieb - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.

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