Authors
Henry Taylor
University of Birmingham
Abstract
Defenders of the phenomenal concept strategy have to explain how both physical and phenomenal concepts provide a substantive grasp on the nature of their referents, whilst referring to the very same experience. This is the ‘new challenge’ to physicalism. In this paper, I argue that if the physicalist adopts the powerful qualities ontology of properties then a new and powerful version of the phenomenal concept strategy can be developed, which answers the new challenge.
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1321678
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References found in this work BETA

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Universe as We Find It.John Heil - 2012 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Powerful Qualities and Pure Powers.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1423-1440.
Dispositions.Michael Fara - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dispositions.Sungho Choi - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Powerful Problems for Powerful Qualities.Henry Taylor - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):425-433.
How Do We Differ When We Differ in Tastes?Daniel Pallies - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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