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The Argument from Marginal Cases: is species a relevant difference
Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):225-235 (2011)
Abstract
Marginal humans are not rational yet we still think they are morally considerable. This is inconsistent with denying animals moral status on the basis of their irrationality. Therefore, either marginal humans and animals are both morally considerable or neither are. In this paper I consider a major objection to this argument: that species is a relevant difference between humans animals.Author's Profile
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2009-11-08
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Citations of this work
Clarifying the Concept of Cruelty: What Makes Cruelty to Animals Cruel.Julia Tanner - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (5):818-835.
Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals.Julia Tanner - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
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