Como Não Devemos Discriminar com Base na Espécie

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1495-1516 (2017)
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We argue that Anthropocentrism – the kind of speciesism that privilegies the human species – is morally unacceptable. We distinguish and criticize three varieties of Anthropocentrism: unqualified, qualified empirical and qualified non-empirical. Firstly, unqualified Anthropocentrism is dismissed because it is grounded on a moral principle which implies that discriminations like racism and sexism are justified. Secondly, qualified empirical Anthropocentrism falls victim to the marginal cases argument, an argument that shows that properties which allegedly attribute moral status to every human and to no animal, ultimately, if they exclude every animal, they also exclude some humans. Lastly, qualified non-empirical Anthropocentrism is rejected due to implausible consequences about which individuals have moral status. After rejecting Anthropocentrism, we consider a generalization of the marginal cases argument against all forms of speciesism. We show that only a species entirely comprised of essentially moral individuals would be unaffected by this argument. However, the possibility of such a species has limited practical import. Contrarily, Anthropocentrism’s moral unacceptability requires profound changes in the way humans relate with animals.



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Author Profiles

Diogo Santos
Universidade de Lisboa
Ricardo Miguel
Universidade de Lisboa

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Especismo.Ricardo Miguel - 2020 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.

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