Abstract

In 19th century Anglo-American political philosophy, one finds an important debate concerning the nature, source and limits of rights. Two of the dominant views here were the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and J. S. Mill and the rights-based political thought of Herbert Spencer. While there are significant differences between them, both arguably reflect a perspective that is both liberal and individualist. ;A response to these views--one that is sometimes taken to be fundamentally incompatible, if not entirely incommensurable, with the Anglo-American liberal tradition--is found in British idealist political thought. The most developed statement of this is, arguably, that of the British philosopher and social reformer, Bernard Bosanquet . Bosanquet argues that, to provide an adequate account of the nature, source and limits of human rights, one must abandon many of the individualist assumptions of his contemporaries. ;The question I address, then, is whether Bosanquet's theory of rights is a plausible response to the 'liberal individualist' views of Bentham, Mill and Spencer. In other words, does Bosanquet address the problems that he finds in these liberal individualist accounts of rights and does he provide a plausible alternative to them? ;My focus here is primarily, but not exclusively, historical. Moreover, I argue that a complete account of Bosanquet's theory of rights requires an elaboration of the "metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality"--"the social ontology"--on which it is based. Thus, in order to answer the question motivating this study, not only do I discuss Bosanquet's theory of rights in relation to the problems in the views of his contemporaries, but also show how it is related to his more general metaphysical concerns. ;In Chapter 1, "The Foundation of Rights in 'Theories of the First Look'," I set the stage for my reconstruction and presentation of Bosanquet's theory of rights. In Chapter 2, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights," I reconstruct Bosanquet's theory of rights and respond to a number of criticisms directed directly to it. In Chapters 3 and 4, I provide and discuss what seem to be the key elements in the 'ontological' or 'metaphysical' background to Bosanquet's position. In the concluding chapter, "Bosanquet's Theory of Rights: An Assessment" , I show how Bosanquet's view avoids or responds to the problems he has identified in the theories of rights of Bentham, Mill and Spencer