Abstract

The dissertation examines the relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical as presented by Soren Kierkegaard in Either/Or. Most secondary literature has understood this work to present two distinct spheres of existence, the aesthetic and the ethical, so that the ethical sphere might be chosen. After sketching this "standard" view of Either/Or, the dissertation demonstrates that, as presented in this work, the aesthetic sphere is not a genuine alternative to the ethical sphere but is itself an ethical construction. Contrary to the "standard" view of this work, then, the reader has no choice in Either/Or but to be ethically good or ethically bad . ;However, while the aesthetic sphere is not a genuine alternative to the ethical, something other to the ethical does interrupt, and thus does provide an alternative to, the ethical in Either/Or. This interruption occurs in Part II; an examination of passion's ability to inform one of a wrong choice demonstrates that ethical passion does not guarantee the commitment and constancy that marks the ethical, but in fact undermines them. Instead of leading to the ethical person, the passion of choice provides an opening to something outside of the ethical construction of the aesthetic/ethical spheres, which I have called a free spirit. While the free spirit heard in Part I of Either/Or is certainly not the same as the aesthete, traces of the voice of a free spirit can be heard in the words of the aesthete. ;The dissertation concludes by acknowledging that the consequences of its examination of Either/Or affect not just that one work, but the entire Kierkegaardian corpus. Because the progression from the aesthetic through the ethical to the religious sphere of existence has been interrupted, the unity of Kierkegaard's works, found in their religious purpose, as well as the unity of Kierkegaard himself as a religious author, is put into question