Modal Normativism on Semantic Rules

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Amie Thomasson’s modal normativism, the function of modal discourse is to convey semantic rules. But what is a "semantic rule"? I raise three worries according to which there is no conception of a semantic rule that can serve the needs of a modal normativist. The first worry focuses on de re and a posteriori necessities. The second worry concerns Thomasson's inferential specification of the meaning of modal terms. The third worry asks about the normative status of semantic rules.

Similar books and articles

Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics.Amie L. Thomasson - 2007 - Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):135-160.
Norms and Necessity. [REVIEW]Delia Belleri - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (1):119-123.
Norms and Necessity.Amie L. Thomasson - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):143-160.
Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality.Lei Zhong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):626-645.
Kako razložiti modalnost?Danilo Šuster - 1992 - Filozofski Vestnik 13 (1).
A Sellarsian Approach to the Normativism-Antinormativism Controversy.Dionysis Christias - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (2):143-175.
Non-Descriptivism About Modality. A Brief History And Revival.Amie Thomasson - 2008 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 4:8.
Against modal dualism.Dirk Franken - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):608-622.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-30

Downloads
333 (#60,966)

6 months
150 (#22,499)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rohan Sud
Virginia Tech

Citations of this work

Norms and necessity: replies to critics.Amie L. Thomasson - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Conceptual Ethics I.Alexis Burgess & David Plunkett - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1091-1101.
What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.

View all 17 references / Add more references