Explaining normative–deliberative gaps is essential to dual-process theorizing

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e143 (2023)
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Abstract

We discuss significant challenges to assumptions of exclusivity and highlight methodological and conceptual pitfalls in inferring deliberative processes from reasoning responses. Causes of normative–deliberative gaps are considered (e.g., disputed or misunderstood normative standards, strategy preferences, task interpretations, cognitive ability, mindware and thinking dispositions) and a soft normativist approach is recommended for developing the dual-process 2.0 architecture.

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