Abstract

It is standard practice among Husserl's interpreters to trace the origins of his later phenomenology back to his Logical Investigations. Following Dagfinn Follesdal, many commentators locate those origins in the theory of linguistic meaning in Investigation I. More recently, J. N. Mohanty has used the theory of intentional acts in Investigation V as an alternative starting point. Both interpretations treat the Logical Investigations as a loosely connected series of studies; Investigations II-IV are largely neglected, and the use of material from the favored investigations is highly selective. ;Using the concepts of genuine science and pure theory expounded in Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic, I propose an interpretation of the Logical Investigations which reconstructs the unity of that work. According to Husserl, if a discipline is to become a genuine science, theoretical work must be preceded by a clarifi- cation of its aims, an adequate demarcation of its proper subject-matter, and a specification of appropriate methods of research. I argue that the Prolegomena and Logical Investigations constitute Husserl's attempt to carry out this program, first for pure logic, and then for epistemology. After discussing the aims of pure logic as set out in the Prolegomena, I present a detailed, unified interpretation of Investigation I as Husserl's demarcation of the logical realm. I show how the demarcation theme can be used to integrate Husserl's discussions of mental imagery and indexical expressions in the middle chapters of that work with his better-known act/content/ object distinction and his views about meanings as ideal species. ;I argue that the other Investigations supplement this interpreta- tion as follows: Investigation II presents a critique of current theories of the logical method of abstraction; Investigations III and IV contain first steps toward a theory of meaning; Investigation V contains the phenomenological foundation for Husserl's demarcation of episte- mology in Investigation VI. Finally, I argue that Ideas, Husserl's most systematic work, follows the same programmatic pattern in attempting to establish philosophy as a rigorous science.