Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):297-307 (2015)
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It is generally acknowledged that confabulation undermines the authority of self-attribution of mental states. But why? The mainstream answer is that confabulation misrepresents the actual state of one’s mind at some relevant time prior to the confabulatory response. This construal, we argue, rests on an understanding of self-attribution as first-person mindreading. Recent developments in the literature on folk psychology, however, suggest that mental state attribution also plays an important role in regulating or shaping future behaviour in conformity with normative expectations. We explore an analogue understanding of self-attribution of mental states in terms of first-person mindshaping. The main aim of this paper is to explore how this insight alters the implications of empirical confabulation studies on first-person authority. We also indicate how this sheds new light on the phenomenon of confabulation itself.



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Socially adaptive belief.Daniel Williams - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):333-354.
Stranger than Fiction: Costs and Benefits of Everyday Confabulation.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):227-249.
Mnemonic Confabulation.Sarah Robins - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):121-132.
The complementarity of mindshaping and mindreading.Uwe Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (3):533-549.

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