Vicious Regresses, Conceptual Analysis, and Strong Awareness Internalism

Ratio 29 (2):115-129 (2015)
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Abstract

That a philosophical thesis entails a vicious regress is commonly taken to be decisive evidence that the thesis is false. In this paper, I argue that the existence of a vicious regress is insufficient to reject a proposed analysis provided that certain constraints on the analysis are met. When a vicious regress is present, some further consequence of the thesis must be established that, together with the presence of the vicious regress, shows the thesis to be false. The argument is provided largely through the examination of Michael Bergmann's vicious regress argument against strong awareness internalism and a partial defense of that thesis against Bergmann.

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Gregory Stoutenburg
York College Of Pennsylvania

References found in this work

The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

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