Abstract

Although virtue ethics is widely considered to be an important alternative to Kantianism and utilitarianism, there is no accepted view of its central tenets. My project in this dissertation is to develop an account of virtuous agency according to Aristotelian virtue ethics and in doing so, argue for a certain understanding of the theory's central claims. The project has two aims: to reject positions commonly, but unfortunately, associated with virtue ethics, and to defend an account of virtuous agency against the background of the parallel Kantian account. ;In support of the first aim, I raise objections to two prominent views within virtue ethics. I argue that it is misguided to see virtue ethics as the solution to anti-moralist objections to Kantianism, as Bernard Williams and Michael Slote do, and moreover, that Slote's non-moral virtue ethics is untenable. I then argue that John McDowell is mistaken to identify virtue with a motivating sensitivity to requirements, because there can be people who have the sensitivity, but lack virtue. His claim that virtue requires the silencing of competing considerations is also mistaken, for it relies on an inadequate understanding of enkrateia. ;I then defend an account of virtuous agency that demonstrates deeper differences with Kantianism than recent work by virtue theorists and Kantians indicates. I argue for a new understanding of the familiar problem for Kant about the emotions and show why virtue ethics has genuine advantages over Kantianism in that respect. The advantages are due to the views that virtue ethics takes regarding moral luck and the noninstrumental value of the emotions, views that are deeply at odds with the Kantian conception of rational moral agency. I also give an account of the virtuous person's reasons for acting and contrast it with the parallel Kantian account. I then argue that a conception of human flourishing is central to virtue ethics, because of its role in justifying actions and because it provides a basis for claims about which traits are virtues. ;The articulation and defense of these central claims of virtue ethics show why it is a promising alternative to other normative theories