Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 35 (1):75-92 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-12-22

Downloads
25 (#654,840)

6 months
9 (#355,374)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Una Stojnic
Princeton University

Citations of this work

The Riddle of Understanding Nonsense.Krystian Bogucki - 2023 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 30 (4):372–411.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references