Abstract
This paper is concerned with Jerry A. Fodor’s critique of the logical structures proposed in Donald Davidson’s “The Logical Form of Action Sentences.” I will have nothing to say below about the parts of Fodor’s paper which deal with the proposals of Davidson’s “Truth and Meaning.” I am inclined to agree with Fodor’s conclusion that, a truth definition for a natural language need not reveal the logical structure of the sentences of the language, though my reasons are quite different from those which Fodor gives. Fodor mentions only the fact that trivial truth definitions are possible; however, even disregarding trivial definitions, I would maintain that a wide range of putative ‘logical forms’ can be consistent with the same assignment of truth values and that the choice among alternative systems of ‘logical form’ must be made on the basis of whether they allow rules of inference and rules of grammar to be stated in full generality.