Abstract

Inherent and universal human dignity was an entirely novel legal concept when it was promulgated by the Universal Declaration of Rights in 1948. Prior to its judicialisation, human dignity had a twofold connotation in anthropology, religion and philosophy, denoting a relationship of contingent status in human relations and relying heavily on duties, rather than rights, as a requirement to achieve dignity. In contrast, the post-WWII paradigm dictates that dignity is equal, universal and unacquired, premised on a right to have one’s inherent dignity respected and protected. The Afrocentric idea of human dignity is also contingent since dignity must be achieved through good deeds towards one’s community, meaning that an individual’s dignity is subordinate to the dignity of one’s community. It has been argued that inherent and universal human dignity is a Western concept, considering that it is rooted in individual rights rather than duties, and therefore takes an approach to human relations that is antithetical to Africa’s communitarian worldview based on duties. Therefore, this chapter explores whether inherent dignity is universal to such an extent that it can accommodate African communitarianism and whether judicialised dignity in all instances should trump the competing rights of a community over individual liberalism and autonomy.