A Critique of Two Criteria of Epistemically Circular Belief

Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):173-183 (2013)
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While there has been a great deal of discussion of whether and when beliefs formed in an epistemically circular manner can be justified, there has been almost no discussion of exactly which beliefs are formed in a circular manner. Here, I discuss two possible accounts of when a belief is formed in an epistemically circular manner, arguing that both have serious problems, and should thus be rejected. Seeing where they founder points the way to a better attempt at a criterion of epistemically circular belief



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Todd Stewart
Illinois State University

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