Abstract

Overshadowed by his critiques of traditional morality and Christianity, many of Nietzsche’s insightful philosophical analyses have often been neglected. Although Nietzsche as philosopher has, at long last, been recognized, his epistemological reflections are a fairly recent discovery in Anglo-American philosophy. This is curious because some of the earliest German interpreters of his thought had emphasized the link between his metaphysical views and his analyses of human knowledge. At the beginning of this century, Eisler and Rittelmeyer discussed the importance of Erkenntnistheorie for a full understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Despite their basic grasp of his philosophical intentions, they sometimes misunderstood or underplayed central points in his critical negations. With rare exceptions, the significance of what Nietzsche called an “internal phenomenology” has often been overlooked. Even when it is alluded to, the full meaning of this method of analysis is not brought out. My intention here is to show how the concept of causality is construed by Nietzsche and how his analysis of its origin is related to a phenomenology of human intentionality. The analysis of the derivation of the idea of causality that is presented by Nietzsche has an intrinsic interest and the issues concerning the formation of the concept and its validity are obviously still vital ones.