Abstract

It is not the case--as is widely assumed--that only sentences can be used to make assertions: speakers can also make assertions by uttering ordinary words and phrases in isolation. That is the central claim of this dissertation. ;This claim is in conflict with certain familiar philosophical doctrines. In particular, we consider: Dummett's view that to assert just is to say an assertoric sentence under conventionally specified conditions; Gareth Evans' idea that, to say that P, it is at least required that the words used express the thought that P ; Frege's so-called context principle, according to which words have meaning only in the context of a sentence; Russell's theory of definite descriptions. ;Having argued that the assertoric use of words and phrases is in conflict with these philosophical doctrines, we consider a defense of these views, to the effect that every assertoric utterance of an word or phrase in isolation is actually an utterance of an elliptical sentence. In Chapter Three, we consider the syntactic ellipsis hypothesis, according to which the utterances in question have sentential Syntactic Structures. In Chapter Four, we consider the semantic ellipsis hypothesis: the hypothesis that the expressions produced are not syntactic sentences, but nevertheless have illocutionary force and express propositions. We argue that neither of these ellipsis hypotheses offers a satisfactory account of the way speakers can and do use words and phrases in isolation. We conclude, therefore, that the defense fails and that speakers can make assertions using words and phrases in isolation