Knowledge Ascriptions and Context‐Sensitivity

In Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

This chapter considers a range of context-dependent constructions, and concludes that there are sufficiently significant disanalogies between all of them and the behavior of epistemic predicates such as ‘know that the bank is open’ to cast doubt upon contextualism in epistemology. It is argued that even if knowledge ascriptions were context-sensitive, this fact about them would not have the explanatory value accorded to it by the contextualist.

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

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