Cruelty, Sadism, and the Joy of Inflicting Pain for its Own Sake

Journal of Philosophical Research 47:23-42 (2022)
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Abstract

The paper offers a theory of cruelty that includes the following claims: First, cruelty is best understood as a disposition to take delight in the very infliction of suffering on others. Thus understood, cruelty is the same phenomenon as that studied and operationalized by psychologists in the last decade or so under the heading of everyday sadism. Second, for people to be cruel, they need not have proper understanding of the moral standing of their victims. Third, ascriptions of cruelty do not depend on judgments regarding the moral wrongness of the assumed cruel act. Fourth, since cruelty is primarily a property of agents rather than of actions, and since actions are not always a reliable indication of cruelty, identifying cruelty is a more challenging task than usually thought.

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Daniel Statman
University of Haifa

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Rejecting the Objectification Hypothesis.Daniel Statman - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):113-130.

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