Abstract

The moral economy of American medicine has been transformed by contentious innovations in organization, administration, regulation, and finance. In many settings old fee-for-service incentives and disincentives have been replaced by those of ``managed care,'' while in other settings they have been diluted or distorted. In the everyday care of patients, old and new may alternate or interact. These innovations may also be having secondary effects on participation in life-sciences research and the development and employment of new technologies, discouraging collective support for preliminary investigation and delaying adoption of improved goods and services until cost-reducing potential has already been realized. This motivational complexity, particularly in its moral dimensions, is hard to address using standard assumptions and methods. I argue for different assumptions, based on the clinical behavior of individual patients rather than the market behavior of aggregated consumers, and I describe a different method, based on an old idea in political economy. I then present a new way to explain the core obligations of clinicians, researchers, and planners and to interpret the policy problems they must now share.