What is a Value Judgement?

Sorites 16:82-92 (2005)

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of a value judgement. I present here my view on this problem, which is a version of non-descriptivism that is similar to but not identical to traditional non-descriptivist theories. The thesis I want to explain and argue for is that S makes a value judgement about x if and only if S expresses his attitude towards x. I explain first explain this thesis by clarifying the concept of an attitude, in I defend the identity between having an attitude towards something and evaluating it, in I distinguish value judgements from judgements that only seem to be evaluative, in I clarify what I mean by `expressing an attitude', and in section I give a concise argument for my view
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