In defense of mentalism and emergent interaction

Journal of Mind and Behavior 12 (2):221-245 (1991)
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Abstract

The mentalist mind-brain model is defended against alleged weaknesses. I argue that the perceived failings are based mostly on misinterpretation of mentalism and emergent interaction. Considering the paradigmatic concepts at issue and broad implications, I try to better clarify the misread mentalist view, adding more inclusive detail, relevant background, further analysis, and comparing its foundational concepts with those of the new cognitive paradigm in psychology. A changed "emergent interactionist" form of causation is posited that combines traditional microdeterminism with emergent "top-down" control. This emergent form of causation has wide application to causal explanation in general and is hypothesized to be the key common precursor for the consciousness revolution and subsequent boom in new worldviews, "systems thinking," emerging new paradigms, and other transformative developments of the 1970s and 1980s

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