Turnabout on consciousness: A mentalist view

Journal of Mind and Behavior 13 (3):259-80 (1992)
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Abstract

Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic dichotomies. Formerly opposed features from previous polar alternatives become merged into a novel unifying synthesis, an unambiguous description of which demands redefinition of old terms or/and the invention of new terminology. The present analysis and interpretation are backed by statements from the early papers

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Citations of this work

Strong Emergence as a Defense of Non-Reductive Physicalism.Carl Gillett - 2002 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 6 (1):87–120.
Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: A neurophysical model of mind €“brain interaction.Henry P. Stapp - 2005 - Philosophical Transactions-Royal Society of London. Biological Sciences 360 (1458):1309-1327.
Complexity-based Theories of Emergence: Criticisms and Constraints.Kari L. Theurer - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (3):277-301.

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