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Moral dynamics: Grounding moral judgment in intuitive physics and intuitive psychology
Cognition 217 (C):104890 (2021)
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Citations of this work
Do people understand determinism? The tracking problem for measuring free will beliefs.Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.
Actual and counterfactual effort contribute to responsibility attributions in collaborative tasks.Yang Xiang, Jenna Landy, Fiery A. Cushman, Natalia Vélez & Samuel J. Gershman - 2023 - Cognition 241 (C):105609.
Revisiting causal pluralism: Intention, process, and dependency in cases of double prevention.Huseina Thanawala & Christopher D. Erb - 2024 - Cognition 248 (C):105786.
If not me, then who? Responsibility and replacement.Sarah A. Wu & Tobias Gerstenberg - 2024 - Cognition 242 (C):105646.
References found in this work
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect.Philippa Foot - 1967 - Oxford Review 5:5-15.
The Role of Conscious Reasoning and Intuition in Moral Judgment.Fiery Cushman, Liane Young & Marc Hauser - 2006 - Psychological Science 17 (12):1082-1089.
Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):204-217.
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