Abstract

In this dissertation my objective is two-fold. First, I try to develop a theory of possible worlds, a theory I call "Haecceitistic Actualism". Second, I try to show that Haecceitistic Actualism is, at least, as plausible as any other theory of possible worlds, and that Haecceitism concerning representation de-re make sense. ;Through the study of various theories of possible worlds, I came to realize the following two facts: irrespective of whether possible worlds are physical or abstract, possible worlds should be understood as things which represent possibilities; and in explaining our ordinary modal opinions and intuitions we don't need complete possibilities in the absolute sense. Concerning the first point, if we understand possible worlds as entities which represent possibilities, then possible worlds do not have to be physical. I think that various ways-things-could-be, which we consider as abstract entities existing in this world, can play the role of representing possibilities. Concerning the second point, if in order to explain our ordinary modal opinions and intuitions it is neither good nor necessary to have the notion of complete possibility in the absolute sense, then the condition of maximality that is commonly imposed on possible worlds has to be reconsidered. In my opinion, the term "maximal" should be understood not as an absolute term but as a relative term. That is to say, the application of the term "maximal" should be dependent on the context in which the notion of possibility is employed. The above two ideas constitute the basic elements of Haecceitistic Actualism