Facts, Truth Conditions, and the Skeptical Solution to the Rule‐Following Paradox

Noûs 32 (S12):313-348 (1998)
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Scott Soames
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The Putnam-Goodman-Kripke Paradox.Robert Kowalenko - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):575-594.

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