Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):285–310 (2003)

Claudine Verheggen
York University
Two readings of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox dominate the literature: either his arguments lead to skepticism, and thus to the view that only a deflated account of meaning is available, or they lead to quietism, and thus to the view that no philosophical account of meaning is called for. I argue, against both these positions, that a proper diagnosis of the paradox points the way towards a constructive, non-sceptical account of meaning.
Keywords rule-following  quietism  skepticism  wittgenstein  mcdowell  wilson
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9205.00204
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References found in this work BETA

Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.
The New Wittgenstein.Alice Crary & Rupert Read (eds.) - 2000 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

Davidson’s Answer to Kripke’s Sceptic.Olivia Sultanescu & Claudine Verheggen - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):8-28.
Meaning, Rationality, and Guidance.Olivia Sultanescu - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
The Community View Revisited.Claudine Verheggen - 2007 - Metaphilosophy 38 (5):612-631.

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