Convention, Role of

In W. Newton-Smith (ed.), A companion to the philosophy of science. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. pp. 56–64 (2000)
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Abstract

The claim that some assertion is true “as a matter of convention” is likely to arise only in the circumstance that the assertion is allowed to be true, though an account of its believability as being warranted by its conformity to observable facts is taken to be inadequate.

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