In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 158-168 (2016)

Authors
Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore
Abstract
John McDowell claims that virtuous people recognize moral reasons using a perceptual capacity that doesn't include desire. I show that the phenomena he cites are better explained if desire makes us see considerations favoring its satisfaction as reasons. The salience of moral considerations to the virtuous, like the salience of food to the hungry, exemplifies the emotional and attentional effects of desire. I offer a desire-based account of how we can follow uncodifiable rules of common-sense morality and how some reasons can be silenced in deliberation. I conclude by arguing that animals can be virtuous by having the right desires
Keywords Desire  Virtue  Silencing Reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Virtue and Reason.John McDowell - 1979 - The Monist 62 (3):331-350.
Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following.John McDowell - 1981 - In S. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule. Routledge. pp. 141--62.
Naturalism and Prescriptivity.Peter Railton - 1989 - Social Philosophy and Policy 7 (1):151.
Motivational Internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis.Richard B. Brandt - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1):23 - 37.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Silencing Desires?Attila Tanyi - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Two Sides of 'Silencing'.Jeffrey Seidman - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):68 - 77.
Reason Internalism.Alan H. Goldman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):505 - 533.
The Moral Grip.Chrisoula Andreou - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
The Desires of Others.Berislav Marušić - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):385-400.
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
An Essay on the Desire-Based Reasons Model.Attila Tanyi - 2006 - Dissertation, Central European University
Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Non-Contingent Reasons.Crystal Thorpe - 2004 - Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2):159-169.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
The Humean Theory of Reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-05-29

Total views
1,362 ( #3,431 of 2,461,690 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
112 ( #5,637 of 2,461,690 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes