Humean Nature How desire explains action, thought, and feeling

Oxford University Press (2017)
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Citations of this work

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).
Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.
Interpersonal comparisons with preferences and desires.Jacob Barrett - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (3):219-241.

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