Backwards Causation in Social Institutions

Erkenntnis 89 (5):1973-1991 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Whereas many philosophers take backwards causation to be impossible, the few who maintain its possibility either take it to be absent from the actual world or else confined to theoretical physics. Here, however, I argue that backwards causation is not only actual, but common, though occurring in the context of our social institutions. After juxtaposing my cases with a few others in the literature and arguing that we should take seriously the reality of causal cases in these contexts, I consider several objections. These objections involve whether the cases should be reinterpreted, whether they are properly within the institution, whether they involve necessitation or else Cambridge changes, whether and how they involve changing the past, and whether this should call us to question institutional reality. I end by suggesting that it is a virtue of our institutions that they allow backwards causation, that this is a kind of technology that they are often built to incorporate.

Similar books and articles

Bilking the bilking argument.Rebecca Roache - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):605-611.
The Good of Aristotle's Teleology.Jerrod S. Elleman - 2000 - Dissertation, The University of Utah
The impossibility of backwards causation.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):439–455.
Causing Yesterday’s Effects.Lynne Spellman - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):145 - 161.
Black on Backwards Causation.Brian Garrett - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):230-233.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-09-08

Downloads
371 (#57,155)

6 months
138 (#29,475)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kenneth Silver
Trinity College, Dublin

References found in this work

Grounding in the image of causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):49-100.
Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
The Construction of Social Reality.John Searle - 1995 - Philosophy 71 (276):313-315.

View all 61 references / Add more references