A condition for transitivity in probabilistic support

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (4):613-616 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is well known that probabilistic support is not transitive. But it can be shown that probabilistic support is transitive provided the intermediary proposition screens off the original evidence with respect to the hypothesis in question. This has the consequence that probabilistic support is transitive when the original evidence is testimonial, memorial or perceptual (i.e., to the effect that such and such was testified to, remembered, or perceived), and the intermediary proposition is its representational content (i.e., to the effect that the such and such occurred).

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,607

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
130 (#167,931)

6 months
24 (#127,189)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tomoji Shogenji
Rhode Island College

References found in this work

Schlesinger and Miracles.Richard Otte - 1993 - Faith and Philosophy 10 (1):93-98.

Add more references