Abstract

This study of self-deception is conducted with a view toward its implications for a general theory of mind. It is guided by the belief that motivated irrationality provides an insight into the nature of standard rational action. ;Intentionally getting oneself to believe what one knows is false is commonly thought to be paradoxical. I argue that, pace certain recent attempts to deny both that self-deception is intentional and that it requires attributing contradictory beliefs to the self-deceived agent, such a description of the self-deceiver must be retained. I go on to make the case that we are required to expand our established schemes of action and belief formation to make room for intentional states and connections that are not rational. ;A powerful consideration appears to lead us in precisely the opposite direction. Irrational states, though obviously different from rational ones, are susceptible to attribution and explanation only in holistic fashion. It is in virtue of their appreciation of this consideration that many philosophers have opted to characterize internal irrationality as an anomaly that can be accommodated by making minor revisions to a general framework in which rationality still plays a central role. I canvass and criticize the most compelling of these "accommodationist" strategies, arguing that they wrongly assume that cases of internal irrationality threaten the conceptual role played by principles of rationality in our explanatory model. Their failure points inevitably toward the more radical thesis that I ultimately defend: rationality is not exhaustively constitutive of intentionality. ;In order to make room for internal irrationality, I argue that we need to introduce 'belief-like states' which are formed under the influence of the imagination and which are expressive of our wishes and emotions. Exploring how belief-like states influence our actions differently in rational and irrational cases, I argue that in the latter the agent plays an active role in blinding himself to the unrealistic nature of these belief-like states. The agent does so by failing to accept some of his attitudes, to experience owning them, and thus treats himself as if he were another